



**Rabobank**

**RaboResearch**

Global Economics &  
Markets  
mr.rabobank.com

Philip Marey

Senior US Strategist  
+31 30 712 1437

# Repossessed

## FOMC Post-Meeting Comment

### Contents

Repo response	1	Inversion signals recession cuts	3
Divided we take our time	2	Repo squeeze part of a larger liquidity problem?	4
Feedback loop to next insurance cut	2		

## Summary

- The Fed cut the target range for the federal funds rate by 25 bps, but the IOER rate and the O/N RRP rate were cut by 30 bps in reaction to the repo turmoil this week.
- However, a more lasting effect would be achieved by raising the level of reserves in the system and launching a standing repo facility. Unfortunately, the Fed is not ready to take these decisions yet. Consequently, we are likely to see more overnight repo operations by the New York Fed in the near term.
- We stick to our view that the feedback loop between trade policy and monetary policy is likely to lead to another insurance cut before the end of the year, but we change our call for the most likely timing from October to December as the divergence of views in the FOMC appears to be leading to temporary policy paralysis on the fed funds rate. In fact, there were three dissenters today. Rosengren and George were against lowering the fed funds rate; in contrast Bullard wanted a 50 bps cut.
- Instead, it does seem that 'organic growth' of the level of reserves will be high on the agenda of the October meeting. The main challenge will be to sell this to the public as something other than QE.
- Meanwhile, in our view the inverted yield curve points to a recession in 2020 that will force the Fed to cut rates all the way to zero before the end of 2020.
- Finally, this week's repo squeeze may be symptomatic of a wider liquidity problem. Due to post-crisis regulation banks are no longer taking the risks necessary to keep the plumbing of the financial system open in times of stress. If the US economy slides into a recession liquidity problems could pop up everywhere. In the worst case, it could turn a run-of-the-mill recession through a financial crisis into something worse.

## Repo response

As widely expected, the FOMC cut the target range for the federal funds rate by 25 bps to 1.75-2.00%. However, the turmoil in the repo market this week and the effective federal funds rate climbing outside the target range (figure 1) has forced the Fed into additional action. After overnight repo operations by the New York Fed, the Board of Governors and the FOMC decided today to cut the IOER rate and the O/N RRP rate by 30 bps instead of 25 bps. During his press conference Powell said the Fed was surprised by the strength of the repo squeeze. Although Powell would not admit it, the extra cut in the IOER rate (to 1.80%) and the O/N RRP rate (to 1.70%) suggests that the Fed is afraid of losing control of its monetary policy framework. After all, if they had perceived this week's extreme spike in the repo rate as a one-off, the overnight repo operations by the New York Fed would suffice.

So it seems they fear the next spike could be as severe as this week's, and therefore they made a larger cut to the IOER rate and the O/N RRP rate than to the target range for the federal funds rate. However, a more lasting effect would be achieved by raising the level of reserves in the


system and launching a standing repo facility. Unfortunately, the Fed is not ready to take these decisions yet. Consequently, we are likely to see more overnight repo operations by the New York Fed in the near term.

## Divided we take our time

Returning to the Fed's main policy rate, the federal funds rate, there were no less than 3 dissenters. What's more, the votes against today's decision came from both sides of the spectrum. On the hawkish side, Rosengren and George were against today's cut. On the dovish side, Bullard wanted a 50 bps cut. The divisions are also visible in the economic projections. The dot plot shows that only 7 out of 17 FOMC participants expect another rate cut before the end of the year. In contrast, the dot plot implies that 5 participants prefer rates to have remained unchanged today. The remaining 5 participants – including the median participant – expect the fed funds rate to stay at today's new level in 2019. We think that this is too optimistic, but it may take some time before there is a majority in the Committee for another insurance cut. Therefore, we change our call for the next insurance cut from October to December. However, this means that we stick to our call for a third insurance cut before the end of the year, after July and September. Note that the previous rate projections, made in June, still showed zero rate cuts for 2019. This was followed by a rate cut in July and September. This shows that questioning the Fed's rate projections is good practice. What's more, the FOMC statement was tweaked only minimally and the promise to 'act as appropriate to sustain the expansion' remained in the text.

Meanwhile, it does seem that 'organic growth' of the level of reserves will be high on the agenda of the October meeting. The main challenge will be to sell this to the public as something other than QE.

Figure 1: Fed funds rate and IOER rate




Source: Macrobond

## Feedback loop to next insurance cut

President Trump tweeted 'Jay Powell and the Federal Reserve Fail Again. No "guts," no sense, no vision! A terrible communicator!' While the Fed is trying to ignore President Trump's criticism on monetary policy, the central bank has managed to get itself entangled in his trade policies. As we explained in 'Fed back to zero', by taking a risk management approach to trade policy uncertainty, the Fed is amplifying the effect of trade policy on monetary policy. All Trump needs to do is raise tariffs or take another protectionist measure to get the Fed to cut rates further. In fact, the Fed is enabling the US administration to be tough on trade as the central bank has promised to offset any expected negative impact on the US economy by cutting rates in advance. This means that the Fed is bolstering Trump's bargaining position in the 'game of chicken' between the US and China that we analyzed a few years ago in 'The Trump Trade War Game'. But it also makes it more likely that President Trump will continue to escalate the trade war. And that makes it more likely

that the Fed will have to make an additional insurance cut. Consequently, there is now a strong feedback loop between trade policy and monetary policy that will force the FOMC to make a third insurance cut before the end of the year. We now think this is most likely to occur in December.

**Figure 2: Inverted yield curve**



Source: Macrobond

## Inversion signals recession cuts

What's more, we think that this is only the beginning. The inversion of the yield curve (figure 2) points to a recession in 2020H2. While the Fed is downplaying this signal because quantitative easing is supposed to be distorting the yield curve, in our recent special [Yield curve inversion: This time is not different](#) we showed that the Fed's argument is both flawed and contradicted by the data. Therefore, the recession signals given by the yield curve should be taken seriously. In fact, we have a recession in 2020H2 in our baseline scenario that will force the Fed to go all the way back to zero next year. In fact, at the press conference Powell said that if the economy weakens more, the FOMC is willing to be aggressive. So the reaction function is in place, all we need is to wait for the Fed to fill in the right inputs. However, in the current economic projections, the Fed expects 2.0% GDP growth in 2020 and rate *hikes* in 2021 and 2022! Our updated full forecast of the Fed's rate path is summarized in table 1.

**Table 1: Rabobank forecasts of FOMC decisions**

<i>FOMC meeting</i>	<i>Decision</i>	<i>Target range for the federal funds rate</i>
		1.75-2.00
30 Oct 2019		1.75-2.00
11 Dec 2019	25 bps insurance cut	1.50-1.75
29 Jan 2020		1.50-1.75
18 Mar 2020		1.50-1.75
29 Apr 2020	25 bps slowdown cut	1.25-1.50
10 June 2020	25 bps recession cut	1.00-1.25
29 July 2020	25 bps recession cut	0.75-1.00
16 Sept 2020	25 bps recession cut	0.50-0.75
5 Nov 2020	25 bps recession cut	0.25-0.50
16 Dec 2020	25 bps recession cut	0.00-0.25

Source: Rabobank

## Repo squeeze part of a larger liquidity problem?

A final thought on this week's repo turmoil. Spikes in repo markets are not uncommon, in fact they tend to take place at specific dates. However, the size of this week's spike shows that there is something wrong with the architecture of US money markets. While the consequences were still limited when the Fed's balance sheet was large, now that reserves have been reduced by almost half from its peak, the cracks have become more visible. While the Fed could fix the repo markets by inundating the system with reserves again and creating a standing repo facility, the underlying problem remains. Evidently, liquidity is a problem at times when everybody wants to go through the same door. Mostly due to post-crisis regulation banks are no longer taking the risks necessary to keep the plumbing of the financial system open in times of stress. At the same time, the size of end users has increased. This means that the Fed has to step in – even if it is only through a standing repo facility – every time investors all head into the same direction.

Also, we should keep in mind that this week's repo squeeze took place under relatively normal circumstances. What if the US economy were to slide into a recession, in line with our baseline scenario? Liquidity problems could then pop up everywhere. In the worst case, it could turn a run-of-the-mill recession through a financial crisis into something worse.

## RaboResearch

Global Economics & Markets  
mr.rabobank.com

### Global Head

---

#### Jan Lambregts

+44 20 7664 9669  
Jan.Lambregts@Rabobank.com

### Macro Strategy

#### Europe

---

#### Elwin de Groot

Head of Macro Strategy  
Eurozone, ECB  
+31 30 712 1322  
Elwin.de.Groot@Rabobank.com

#### Stefan Koopman

Market Economist  
Eurozone, UK  
+31 30 712 1328  
Stefan.Koopman@Rabobank.com

#### Teeuwe Mevissen

Senior Market Economist  
Eurozone  
+31 30 712 1509  
Teeuwe.Mevissen@Rabobank.com

#### Bas van Geffen

Quantitative Analyst  
ECB  
+31 30 712 1046  
Bas.van.Geffen@Rabobank.com

#### Wim Boonstra

Senior Advisor  
Germany  
+31 30 216 2666  
Wim.Boonstra@Rabobank.nl

#### Koen Verbruggen

Economist  
France  
+31 6 129 73 956  
Koen.Verbruggen@Rabobank.nl

#### Alexandra Dumitru

Economist  
UK, Ireland  
+31 30 216 0441  
Alexandra.Dumitru@Rabobank.nl

#### Maartje Wijffelaars

Senior Economist  
Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece  
+31 30 216 8740  
Maartje.Wijffelaars@Rabobank.nl

#### Michiel van der Veen

Economist  
Eurozone  
+31 6 831 34 616  
Michiel.van.der.Veen@rabobank.nl

#### Americas

---

#### Philip Marey

Senior Market Strategist  
United States, Fed  
+31 30 712 1437  
Philip.Marey@Rabobank.com

#### Hugo Erken

Head of International Economics  
United States  
+31 30 215 2308  
Hugo.Erken@Rabobank.nl

#### Christian Lawrence

Senior Market Strategist  
Canada, Mexico  
+1 212 808 6923  
Christian.Lawrence@Rabobank.com

#### Mauricio Oreng

Senior Market Strategist  
Brazil  
+55 11 5503 7315  
Mauricio.Oreng@Rabobank.com

#### Asia-Pacific

---

#### Michael Every

Senior Market Strategist  
Asia, Australia, New Zealand  
+852 2103 2612  
Michael.Every@Rabobank.com

#### Björn Giesbergen

Senior Economist  
China, Japan  
+31 30 216 2562  
Bjorn.Giesbergen@Rabobank.nl

#### Hugo Erken

Head of International Economics  
India  
+31 30 215 2308  
Hugo.Erken@Rabobank.nl

### FX Strategy

---

#### Jane Foley

Head of FX Strategy  
G10 FX  
+44 20 7809 4776  
Jane.Foley@Rabobank.com

#### Piotr Matys

FX Strategist  
Central & Eastern Europe FX  
+44 20 7664 9774  
Piotr.Matys@Rabobank.com

#### Christian Lawrence

Senior Market Strategist  
LatAm FX  
+1 212 808 6923  
Christian.Lawrence@Rabobank.com

## Rates Strategy

---

### Richard McGuire

Head of Rates Strategy  
+44 20 7664 9730  
Richard.McGuire@Rabobank.com

### Lyn Graham-Taylor

Senior Rates Strategist  
+44 20 7664 9732  
Lyn.Graham-Taylor@Rabobank.com

### Matt Cairns

Senior SSA Strategist  
+44 20 7664 9502  
Matt.Cairns@Rabobank.com

## Credit Strategy & Regulation

---

### Ruben van Leeuwen

Head of Credit Strategy  
ABS, Covered Bonds  
+31 30 712 1391  
Ruben.van.Leeuwen@Rabobank.com

### Vaclav Vacikar

Analyst  
Financials  
+31 30 712 1519  
Vaclav.Vacikar@Rabobank.com

### Hyung-Ja de Zeeuw

Senior Strategist  
Corporates  
+31 30 712 1555  
Hyung-Ja.de.Zeeuw@Rabobank.com

### Bas van Zanden

Senior Analyst  
Pension funds, Regulation  
+31 30 712 1869  
Bas.van.Zanden@Rabobank.com

### Cas Bonsema

Analyst  
ABS  
+31 30 712 1849  
Cas.Bonsema@Rabobank.com

## Energy Markets

---

### Ryan Fitzmaurice

Energy Strategist  
+1 212 916 7874  
Ryan.Fitzmaurice@Rabobank.com

## Agri Commodity Markets

---

### Stefan Vogel

Head of ACMR  
+44 20 7664 9523  
Stefan.Vogel@Rabobank.com

### Carlos Mera

Senior Commodity Analyst  
+44 20 7664 9512  
Carlos.Mera@Rabobank.nl

### Michael Magdovitz

Commodity Analyst  
+44 20 7664 9969  
Michael.Magdovitz@Rabobank.com

## Client coverage

### Wholesale Corporate Clients

Martijn Sorber	Global Head	+31 30 712 3578	Martijn.Sorber@Rabobank.com
Hans Deusing	Netherlands	+31 30 216 9045	Hans.Deusing@Rabobank.com
David Kane	Europe	+44 20 7664 9744	David.Kane@Rabobank.com
Neil Williamson	North America	+1 212 808 6966	Neil.Williamson@Rabobank.com
David Teakle	Australia, New Zealand	+61 2 8115 3101	David.Teakle@Rabobank.com
Ethan Sheng	Asia	+852 2103 2688	Ethan.Sheng@Rabobank.com
Ricardo Rosa	Brazil	+55 11 5503 7150	Ricardo.Rosa@Rabobank.com

### Financial Institutions

Eddie Villiers	Global Head	+44 20 7664 9834	Eddie.Villiers@Rabobank.com
Roeland Bronsveld	Benelux	+31 30 216 9030	Roeland.Bronsveld@Rabobank.com
Krishna Nayak	Germany, Austria, CEE	+44 20 7664 9883	Krishna.Nayak@Rabobank.com
Philippe Macart	France	+44 20 7664 9893	Philippe.Macart@Rabobank.com
Mauro Giachero	Italy	+44 20 7664 9892	Mauro.Giachero@Rabobank.com
Martin Best	UK, Scandinavia, Middle East	+44 20 7809 4639	Martin.Best@Rabobank.com
Paul Duddy	USA	+1 212 916 3799	Paul.Duddy@Rabobank.com
Wouter Eijsvogel	Treasury Sales Europe	+31 30 216 9723	Wouter.Eijsvogel@Rabobank.com
David Pye	Central Banks	+44 20 7664 9865	David.Pye@Rabobank.com

### Capital Markets

Herald Top	Global Head of Capital Markets	+31 30 216 9501	Herald.Top@Rabobank.com
Nader Pasdar	Capital Markets USA	+1 212 808 6861	Nader.Pasdar@Rabobank.com
Adam Wotton	Capital Markets Asia	+852 2103 2629	Adam.Wotton@Rabobank.com
Willem Kröner	Global Head of Equity Capital Markets	+31 30 712 4783	Willem.Kroner@Rabobank.com
Crispijn Kooijmans	DCM FIs & SSAs	+31 30 216 9028	Crispijn.Kooijmans@Rabobank.com
Bjorn Alink	DCM Securitisation & Covered Bonds	+31 30 216 9393	Bjorn.Alink@Rabobank.com
Othmar ter Waarbeek	DCM Corporate Bonds	+31 30 216 9022	Othmar.ter.Waarbeek@Rabobank.com
Joris Reijnders	DCM Corporate Loans	+31 30 216 9510	Joris.Reijnders@Rabobank.com
Brian Percival	DCM Leveraged Finance	+44 20 7809 3156	Brian.Percival@Rabobank.com

---

## Disclaimer

### Non Independent Research

This document is issued by Coöperatieve Rabobank U.A. incorporated in the Netherlands, trading as Rabobank (Rabobank) a cooperative with excluded liability. The liability of its members is limited. Rabobank is authorised by De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) and the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM). Rabobank London Branch (RL) is authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and subject to limited regulation by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and PRA. Details about the extent of our authorisation and regulation by the PRA, and regulation by the FCA are available from us on request. RL is registered in England and Wales under Company no. FC 11780 and under Branch No. BR002630. This document is directed exclusively to Eligible Counterparties and Professional Clients. It is not directed at Retail Clients.

This document does not purport to be impartial research and has not been prepared in accordance with legal requirements designed to promote the independence of Investment Research and is not subject to any prohibition on dealing ahead of the dissemination of Investment Research. This document does NOT purport to be an impartial assessment of the value or prospects of its subject matter and it must not be relied upon by any recipient as an impartial assessment of the value or prospects of its subject matter. No reliance may be placed by a recipient on any representations or statements made outside this document (oral or written) by any person which state or imply (or may be reasonably viewed as stating or implying) any such impartiality.

This document is for information purposes only and is not, and should not be construed as, an offer or a commitment by RL or any of its affiliates to enter into a transaction. This document does not constitute investment advice and nor is any information provided intended to offer sufficient information such that it should be relied upon for the purposes of making a decision in relation to whether to acquire any financial products. The information and opinions contained in this document have been compiled or arrived at from sources believed to be reliable, but no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made as to their accuracy, completeness or correctness.

The information contained in this document is not to be relied upon by the recipient as authoritative or taken in substitution for the exercise of judgement by any recipient. Any opinions, forecasts or estimates herein constitute a judgement of RL as at the date of this document, and there can be no assurance that future results or events will be consistent with any such opinions, forecasts or estimates. All opinions expressed in this document are subject to change without notice.

To the extent permitted by law, neither RL, nor other legal entities in the group to which it belongs accept any liability whatsoever for any direct or consequential loss howsoever arising from any use of this document or its contents or otherwise arising in connection therewith.

Insofar as permitted by applicable laws and regulations, RL or other legal entities in the group to which it belongs, their directors, officers and/or employees may have had or have a long or short position or act as a market maker and may have traded or acted as principal in the securities described within this document (or related investments) or may otherwise have conflicting interests. This may include hedging transactions carried out by RL or other legal entities in the group, and such hedging transactions may affect the value and/or liquidity of the securities described in this document. Further it may have or have had a relationship with or may provide or have provided corporate finance or other services to companies whose securities (or related investments) are described in this document. Further, internal and external publications may have been issued prior to this publication where strategies may conflict according to market conditions at the time of each publication.

This document may not be reproduced, distributed or published, in whole or in part, for any purpose, except with the prior written consent of RL. By accepting this document you agree to be bound by the foregoing restrictions. The distribution of this document in other jurisdictions may be restricted by law and recipients of this document should inform themselves about, and observe any such restrictions.

Please email [fm.global.unsubscribe@rabobank.com](mailto:fm.global.unsubscribe@rabobank.com) to be removed from this mailing list

A summary of the methodology can be found on our website [www.rabobank.com](http://www.rabobank.com)

© Rabobank London, Thames Court, One Queenhithe, London EC4V 3RL +44(0) 207 809 3000